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1. Introduction
The conventional definition'of a competitive equilibrium does not ensure a Pareto ef-
jficient outcome for the overlapping generations economy [Gale (1973), Samuelson (1958) .
This well-known finding has widely been interpreted to mean that some form of government
'i ' '
intervention is essential to ensure efficiency in dynamic open-ended economies with nonal-
truistic finite-lived agents. See, for example, Azariadis (1993, pp. 270-271) and Champ and
Freeman (1994, pp. 206-207).
In Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991) we question whether the conventional definition of a com
petitive equilibrium, as applied to an overlapping generations economy, is truly satisfactory.
The conventional definition was developed for a standard Walrasian economy with a finite
number of consumers and goods whereas the overlapping generations economy necessarily
contains an infinite number of consumers and goods. As noted by Shell (1971), the pres
ence of this double infinity in overlapping generations economies introduces a new trading
opportunity: namely, the possibility of incurring and roUing over a debt forever as time
proceeds into the infinite future. The problem with applying the conventional equilibrium
definition to the overlapping generations economy is that it does not contain any conditions
that recognize this new trading opportunity. Rather, private agents are assumed to focus
narrowly on consumption and production opportunities, ignoring possible profit opportu
nities arising from debt issue and roll over. Is it really surprising, then, that outcomes in
overlapping generations economies can fail to be Pareto efficient in the absence of government
intervention?
Using Samuelson's (1958) overlapping generations economy as an illustration, we show
in Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991) that the introduction of a private, earnings-driven, price-
taking intermediary that is willing and able to arbitrage profit opportunities associated
with debt issue can have a dramatic impact on the efficiency properties of the overlapping
generations economy. For example, regardless of the precise form assumed for the earnings
objective of the interrhediary, Pareto inefficient outcomes are ruled oiit' as equilibria since
the intermediary necessarily perceives unbounded earnings opportunities.
Extending this prior work, the current paper introduces a private earnings-driven price-
setting corporation into the basic monetary overlapping generations economy studied by
Grandmont and Laroque (1973), Balasko and Shell (1981), and Grandmont (1985), among
others. The corporation issues unsecured debt in the form of stock shares. In the initial
period the corporation announces its current and future stock share prices and expected
dividend payments in an attempt to maximize its market value in accordance with the
interests of its successive shareholders. The conventional definition of a monetary equilibrium
is generalized to include this corporate objective.
We wish to stress that, as a setter of its share prices, the corporation we introduce is
fundamentally different from the other private-sector agents in the model, i.e., the consumers.
In particular, the corporation acts as a market-maker for the price-taking consumers. If the
corporation were able to choose both the price and the quantity of the shares it traded,
then it would indeed be a government-like agent with extraordinary powers. However, our
corporation operates under the policy that it will buy or sell any quantity of shares desired
by consumers at the share prices it announces. The corporation's problem, then, is not
unlike that of many real-world intermediaries who must find a set of prices that will attract
satisfiable customers while generating a positive rate of return. Intuitively, what we find is
that efficiency is generated as the corporation adjusts its share prices in pursuit of higher
rates of return for its shareholders.
More precisly, we first derive a necessary and sufficient condition for an allocation for
our "Corporate Economy" to be Pareto efficient. We then establish that all equilibrium
allocations for the Corporate Economy are Pareto efficient, coinciding with the golden rule
allocation, if consumer preferences satisfy gross substitutability. Moreover, the equilibrium
set is non-empty. In particular, we show that the corporation plays a meaningful role in the
economy—issuing positively-priced unsecured debt and earning a windfall return—whenever
the value of the initial real money balances held by consumers fails to equal the particular
value needed to support the Pareto efficient golden rule equilibrium. We further show that
a similar first welfare theorem and existence theorem are obtained in the absence of gross
substitutability if the offer curve of each consumer satisfies, certain curvature restrictions of
the.type studied by Grandmont (1985). Without these curvature restrictions, the corporation
faces an interesting time inconsistency problem. . • •.
-We also investigate the dynamic properties of Corporate Economy equilibria. Given gross
substitutability, the golden rule consumption allocation is immediately obtained. In the ab
sence of gross substitutability, only three types of eqiiihbriuiii dynamic behavior are possible:
either (a) the economy enters immediately into a cycle with a period 2 orbit; or (b) the econ
omy converges to a limit cycle with a period 2 orbit; or (c) the economy converges cychcally
to the golden rule consumption allocation. In contrast, Grandmont (1985) establishes for the
basic monetary overlapping generations economy that k periodic {k > 2) or even aperiodic
equilibria can exist. Thus, although an endogenous "business cycle" is still possible, intro
ducing a private earnings-driven corporation into the basic mpne^ry overlapping generations
economy eliminates the more complex (and Pareto inefficient) equilibria.
The work closest in spirit to our own is the seminal paper by E. Thompson (1967).
Thompson asserts (p. 1205) that if interest rates were forever too low for Pareto efficiency,
then private corporate firrns would proceed to,bid up interest rates by issuing new debts to
finance current new expenditures. Despite Thompson's important insight, many researchers
using the overlapping generations franiework continue to exclude private corporate inter
mediaries. The current paper supports Thompson's claim that, to be a fully articulated
general equilibriurn model, the standard overlapping generations economy must be extended
to permit the entry of-private corporate intermediaries willing and able to ^ke advantage of
unexploited profit opportunities through private debt issue.
2. Consumer Optimization in the Corporate Economy
The Corporate Economy is a pure'exchange overlapping generations (OG) economy that
begins in period I'and extends into the infinite future. The economy's population growth
rate is equal to zero, and each generation consists of one two-period lived consumer. The
economy contains a single perishable consumable resource that provides consumers with
utility. The resource available during period t will be referred to as good i.
Consumers born in periods t >1 are identical aside from time of birth. The "generation
t" consumer is born at the beginning of period t and lives through the end of period i 4- 1.
Each generation t consumer is endowed with > 0 units of good t and tu® > 0 units of
good i H- 1. Letting cind denote the young and old age consumption levels of the
generation t consumer, it is assumed that his lifetime consumption preferences are measured
by a utility function that is twice continuously difFerentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly quasi-concave, and satisfies = (7(C(,0) = t/(0,0). Moreover, it will be
assumed that the indifference curves generated by U{-) do not come arbitrarily close to
being either kinked or linear, in the sense of Balasko and Shell (1980, Prop. 5.6, Properties
C and C). Finally, letting Ui and U2 denote the partial derivatives of the utility function
with respect to c? and respectively, it is also assumed that
H < 1 . (1)
^ ^ U2(wy,w°)
The implications of these utihty function regularity conditions will be clarified below.
Consumers can hold both government-issued fiat money and stock shares issued by a
private corporation. Let Mt denote the quantity ofmoney held by the generation t consumer
from period t to period i -f 1, and let Pt denote the price of good t in terms of fiat money.
The generation t consumer obtains the Mt units of money by trading away Mt/Pt units of
the good t endowment. In period i + 1, the M( units of money can be used to purchase
MtlPt+i units of good i + 1. Thus, as long as the prices Pt and Pt+i are not infinite, the
generation t consumer is able to transfer wealth from period t to period f+ 1 by choosing to
obtain and hold fiat money.
Let 9t denote the number of stock shares purchased {9t > 0) or sold short [6t < 0) in
period t by the generation t consumer, and let Vt denote the price of a share in period i,
measured in terms of good t. The consumer purchases or sells short the Ot shares in return
for VtOt units of good t In period i+ 1, the consumer then receives or pays out [uj+i
units of good t + 1, where denotes the expected per share dividend. Thus, in addition
to saving through money holding, the generation t consumer is able'to save or borrow from
period t to period t + 1 through share transactions.
Given these specifications, the lifetime utihty maximization problemfacing the generation
t consumer can be represented as
maxf/(c5',cj+i) (2)
with respect to c^, and Ot subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
~ [Mt/Pt] - VtOt ]
= [^t/-Pt+ll + [^t+l + !
-f+l
0 <
I
Thegeneration t consumer takes as given .the (possibly infinite) positive goods prices Pt and
Pt+u the finite nonnegative share prices Vt and Uf+i, and the finite nonnegative expected per
share dividend
The regularity conditions on. the utility function f/(*) guarantee that each consumer in
generation t>l will choose Cf > 0 and •> 0. Given Vt > 0, the first-order conditions for
problem (2) require that
MRSi<^,c%,) = qt, (3)
where
^ -J±l±^ (4)
Vt
denotes the expected rate of return on holding shares from period t to t-\- I.
Let St = —c\ denote the savings of the generation t consumer. For later purposes, it
will now be shown that the budget constraints for problem (2) can be simply expressed in
terms of St and the share rate of return qt over the range 0 < < +oo whenever Vt > 0.
The proof of the following proposition (and all subsequent propositions) can be found in an
appendix to this paper.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose > 0 and 0 < qt < +oo. Then a finite solution exists for
problem (2) if and only if either 0 < PtiPt+i < qt or Pt and Pt+i are both infinite. In either
case the budget constraints for problem (2) can he expressed without loss ofgenerality as
4 = -St-, (5)
c t+i = (6)
0 ^ ; (T)
and the optimal consumption and savings levels of the generation t consumer are uniquely
determined as functions of the period t share rate of return q^, where
s{qt) if and only if qt > MRS{w^,w'').
In the initial period 1 the Corporate Economy consists of one generation 1 young con
sumer and one generation 0 old consumer. The generation 0 old consumer is endowed with
iv° units of good 1 and a positive amount Mq offiat money issued (once and for all time) by
government. The generation 0 old consumer is the entrepreneur who starts the corporation,
hence he is also endowed with an initial positive quantity of stock shares, ^o- To retain
symmetry with other consumers, it is assumed that the generation 0 old consumer plans to
sell these shares at the unit price Vj and expects a per share dividend payment d^.
The utility of the generation 0 consumer in period 1 is assumed to increase with increases
in his consumption level cj. Thus, the generation 0 old consumer chooses cj to satisfy
Cj = w° + MojPi + vi + d^ 6q . (8)
Note from (8) that the introduction of fiat money and corporate stock shares gives the
generation 0 old consumer a potential wealth windfall.
3. The Corporation
A distinguishing feature of the corporate form of business is that a corporation can
outlive any particular shareholder and generally has no foreseeable date of termination. As
an approximation to this reality, we suppose that the corporation has an infinite planning
horizon spanning all successive generations of its shareholders. Moreover, since the focus of
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the present study is on the ability of corporations to incur and roll over debt, we simpHfy the
analysis by abstracting from the production process. That is, we assume that the corporation
has no capital assets and employs no labor, and hence produces no physical output by which
to generate earnings. -Nonetheless, the corporation can borrow. As will be clarified, below,
this permits in principle the continual pay-out of positive dividends financed by successive
debt accumulation and roll over, hence the shares of the corporation need not be valueless.
We cLssume that the corporation acts in the interests of its shareholders. Examining the
budget constraints (5) and (6), note that the optimized lifetime utility of the generation
t consumer is an increasing function of qt^ the expected rate of return on holding shares
from period t to period t + 1, over the range qt > MRS{w^,w°) where the consumer's
optimal savings level.${qt) is nonnegative. Examining the budget constraint (8), note that
the utility of the generation 0 consumer is an increasing function of [ui -hdl]6o, his expected
windfall return from stock share ownership. To what extent can the corporation control
these quantities?
By definition (4), the expected share rate of return qt depends upon ,the share prices Vt
and vt+i and the expected dividend dl^i. It follows that the corporation's control over qt
depends upon its control over share prices and expected dividends. In reaHty, corporations
can and do influence their stock share prices by buying and selling their own shares. Here it
is assumed that the corporation actually sets its own share prices by agreeing to buy or sell
any quantity of shares at the share prices it desires to support.
In particular, at the beginning of period 1 the corporation announces a sequence v =
(wi, U2,...) offinite nonnegative share prices Vt together with a sequence d® = (rfj, ...) of
finite nonnegative expected dividend payments In announcing this pair of sequences I =
(v,d®), henceforth referred to as a prospectus^ the "corporation takes nominal goods prices
35 given. It is assumed that the announced prospectus is known to, all current and potential
shareholders. Although thedividend expectations,of shareholders can differ in principle from
the dividend expectations of the corporation as embodied in its prospectus, the definition
of an equilibrium given below in section 5 will follow the usual convention in assuming that
7
these expectations coincide. Without loss of generality, then, we simplify the exposition
below by using the same notation to represent these expectations.
The corporation desires to exist indefinitely, implying that it must be concerned both
with the feasibility of its prospectus and with the optimality of its prospectus as perceived
by potential shareholders. We begin by characterizing the subset of prospectuses perceived
by the corporation to be "viable." We then explain how the corporation winnows down this
subset lexicographically, in the interests of its successive shareholders, in order to obtain an
"optimal choice set" for selection of a prospectus in the initial period 1.
The corporation only considers prospectuses that it expects to be able to support. Since
the corporation has no physical assets and no earnings capacity from physical production,
the shares that it issues represent unsecured debt. The quantity v^Oq measures the value of
corporate debt which matures in period 1. The only way that the corporation can repay this
debt is by rolling it over. In order for the corporation to remain solvent, the value of debt
that it issues in period 1, ui^i, must be at least as great as the debt maturing in period 1,
vi^o- More generally, the incremental change in the value of corporate shares outstanding in
any period t >1, measured in terms of good t, is given by
TTt = Vt[Ot - 0(_i] , (9)
the net earnings of the corporation in period t. It follows by a simple induction argument
that the corporation is solvent in period t only if ttj > 0.
If TTt > 0, i.e., if 9t > 6t-i, the corporation is issuing new shares in period t to cover an
increase in the demand for its shares. In this case the corporation has positive net earnings
in period t equal to ttj units ofgood t. Because good t is perishable, any net earnings held by
the corporation become worthless at the end of the period. It is therefore assumed that the
corporation pays out all net earnings in the form of dividends to its shareholders. Letting
dt denote the good t dividend per share paid to the (old aged) shareholder in period t, who
holds 6t-i shares, it follows that
TTi = •dtOt.i . (10)
From an empirical standpoint, the corporation modeled here is an extreme case in that
all of its dividends are financed by incurring new debt. However, many corporations do
occasionally borrow to support a dividend distribution when earnings are. low. In 1989, for
example, Kane (1989, p. 36) argued that I'zombie firms...constitute roughly 25 percent of
the FSLIC-insured thrift industry," where a zombie^ thrift is a thrift with zero enterprise-
contributed capital that must rely on FSLIC guarantees to keep attracting new deposits to
pay off previous debts. .Our model is an abstraction that allows us to focus on the efficiency
and stability implications of debt roll over. The possible need for guarantees to ensure the
viability of the corporation currently under consideration is taken up in section 4. -
In period 1 the corporation forms an estimate 6^ = ^<(1, P) for the quantity of shares
9t that the corporation expects the generation t consumer to demand, t > 1, conditional
on a nominal goods price sequence P = ,(Pi, P25 •••) ^ prospectus I = (v,d®,). The
corporation's period t expected net earnings are then given by -
= Vt[Ot - OU] . ' (11)
where 6q ="6q. .Consequently, the dividend per share that the corporation privately
expects to distribute in period t must satisfy
dr&u = (12)
For concreteness, it is henceforth assumed that the corporation sets = 0 if = 0.
If the privately-expected dividend payments (12) were to differ from those announced in
the prospectus I, the corporation would be deliberately deceiving its potential shareholders.
We assume that the corporation does not engage in this behavior. Rather, we assume that
the corporation's pubhcly announced prospectus I exhibits dividend consistency in the sense
that the dividend sequence d® appearing in I coincides with the dividend sequence d®"
privately anticipated by the corporation.
In forming its share"demand estimates Of, the corporation takes into account certain
general structural implications of the utility maximization problem (2). In particular, the
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corporation recognizes that: (i) if the share price Vt is positive, then the share demand Ot
for generation t will be bounded above; (ii) if Vt is zero and the expected per-share return
is positive, then the share demand Ot will be infinitely large; and (iii) if Vt is
positive and [uf+i + c^f+i] is zero, then the share demand Oi will be infinitely negative. This
corporate knowledge will be referred to as structural rationality. Finally, the corporation is
also assumed to be aware that the total resources + w° available in the economy in each
period t constitute a bounded sequence, implying that the sequence of real share demands,
VtOt, must also be bounded over time.
A prospectus will be said to be viable from the viewpoint of the corporation if it sat
isfies the following three properties: (i) it generates noniiegative expected net earnings in
each period; (ii) it exhibits dividend consistency relative to the corporation's structurally
rational share demand expectations; and (iii) it implies a bounded sequence of expected
real share demands. The set of viable prospectuses is nonempty, for it always contains the
null prospectus consisting of zero-valued share prices and zero-valued expected dividend pay
ments. Moreover, using definition (9) for expected net earnings together with the assumed
structural rationality of the corporation's share demand expectations^ the following property
can be shown to hold for any viable prospectus I: if Vt is zero in any period i > 1, then I
must be the null prospectus.
The corporation is assumed to limit its attention to the subset of viable prospectuses that
are in accordance with the interests of its successive shareholders. As will now be detailed,
this involves the lexicographic construction of a nested sequence {It) of subsets of viable
prospectuses /<, where each It is optimal for generation t conditional on It-i.
The set Iq is the (possibly empty) subset of viable prospectuses yielding the highest
possible wealth windfall [i^i + dl]6o for the generation 0 old consumer. If Iq is empty, it is
assumed the corporation sets Ii = Iq. If Iq is nonempty and the wealth windfall entailed
by each prospectus in Iq is positive, it follows by dividend consistency and the assumed
positivity of that the share price Vi for each of the prospectuses in 7o must also be
positive. In this case the share rate of return for generation 1 is well-defined, and the
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corporation is assumed to restrict its attention further to the (possibly empty) subset Ii of
viable prospectuses in Iq for which qi is as large as possible. If, instead, Iq is nonempty and
each prospectus in Iq entails a zero wealth windfall, then it follows by nonnegativity of ui
and dl and positivity of Oq that the share price Vi must be zero for each prospectus in Iq.
As previously- explained, viability then implies that Iq is a singleton set containing only the
null prospectus and hence cannot be further restricted for the benefit of future generations.
In this case it is supposed that the corporation simply sets /j = Jo-
Suppose, now, that the corporation has constructed It for some t > I. If /f is the empty
set, it is assumed that the corporation simply sets It+i = U- If It is nonempty but Vt is
zero for some (hence for all) prospectuses,in 7^, then, as previously explained, It must be a
singleton set consisting of the null prospectus. In this case no further winnowing of It for
the benefit of future generations is possible, and it is assumed that the corporation again
sets 7f+i = It.
To complete the inductive construction of it remains to show how the corporation
constructs when It is nonempty and Vt is positive for each prospectus in It. In this
case, by construction of It-, qt is well defined and attains its largest possible value for each
prospectus in If This largest possible value must be positive; for, if not, then must be
zero for each prospectus in It. As previously explained, It would then have to be a singleton
set containing only the null prospectus, a contradiction. A positive largest possible value for
qt implies that Vt+i must be positive, hence the share rate of return qt+i for generation i + 1
is well-defined for each prospectus in It- The corporation is then assumed to further restrict
its attention to the (possibly empty) subset of viable prospectuses in It for which ^^+1
is as large as possible. ,
Let X(P) denote the (possibly empty) set of viable prospectuses that remains after all
winnowing is complete, that is, let 2"(P) denote the intersection of the subsets It for t > 1.
The set Z(P) then represents the corporation's optimal choiceset for selection of a prospectus
in period 1. The corporation is assumed to be indifferent among all prospectuses in X(P).
The success of a modern corporation is often judged by the market value of its ou^tand-
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ing shares. The behavior of our corporation is consistent with this viewpoint. Given the
definition (11) for expected net earnings, the definition (12) for the expected per share divi
dend, and dividend consistency, if follows that d\6Q = Vi[B\ —9q] and hence [vi-\-dl]Oo =
This last relation shows that, by maximizing the expected windfall return [vi + to the
generation 0 old consumer, the corporation also maximizes the expected market value
of its outstanding shares at the end of period 1. Furthermore, assuming VtOf ^ 0, and using
(12) and dividend consistency to eliminate from the expression (4) for one obtains
" =^ • (13)
Consequently, by maximizing the expected share rate of return qt for the generation t con
sumer, the corporation also maximizes the expected incremental increase in the market value
of its shares from period t to period t + 1.
4. Viability of the Corporation
The only way the corporation described in section 3 can viably enhance the welfare of
its shareholders is by incurring debt and rolling it over forever. Although VtOt measures the
market value of the corporation's stock shares during period t, it also measures the market
value of the corporation's debt during period t. Thus, in attempting to increase the rate of
return qt that the generation t consumer receives for holding its shares, the corporation also
increases the rate at which it assumes unsecured debt. This has led some to conclude that
a privately owned firm such as the one described here is not viable. There are three basic
arguments.
One argument, discussed by Lerner (1959, p. 523), is that such a firm operates as an
illegal "chain letter" or "Ponzi scheme." However, as Lerner also recognized, as long as
the economy extends into the infinite future, no one need be hurt by the chain letter aspect
because correspondents need not run out. More precisely, our corporation can viably operate
in an economy with an infinite time horizon as long as it attracts enough shareholders in
each period t to fund the obligations it incurs in period t —1.
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The second argument is related to the corporation's'net worth position. At the end
of each period the corporation has•novassets-(all receipts are paid out in the form of
either share redemptions or dividends), but it still has a liability equal to VtOt. Recognizing
this, Cass and Yaari (1966, p. 360) conclude that "it is certainly .the .case that a privately
owned financial .intermediary will, not rescue the-economy from inefficiency." While"it has
a negative net worth position whenever it operates, the firrn can guarantee itself a zero net
worth position by never choosing to operate.»
This argument assumes that a firm will use net worth per se to gauge its proper course
of action, with a negative net worth position being a shut down point; However, the owners
of a corporation—its shareholders-rHDnly care-about net .worth .to the extent' that it affects
the total net returns (capital gains or losses plus dividend distributions) that are associated
with holding shares in the corporation. Paradoxically, in our setting, a negative net worth
position is actually necessary in order for the corporation.to obtain positive total net returns
for its shareholders in each period. , • ,; . t
A third argument is that the corporation's survival 'might be threatened by the entry
of other organizations which also seek to incui: and roll over debt. In our context, the
generation 0 old consumer who starts the corporation will likely receive a.wealth windfall.
However, this windfall can only be obtained if the generation 1 consumer can be persuaded
to buy shares in the corporation. Suppose that the generation 1 consumer "gets smart"
and refuses to purchase shares in the corporation started by the generation 0 consumer,
opting instead to start a. similar corporation, at the beginning of period 2. If successful,
the generation 1 consumer would receive the wealth windfall rather than the generation 0
consumer. Of course, the generation 1 consumer would face the same problem that the
generation 0 consumer faced. Thus, there is a real possibility that the corporation could
never get started. Moreover, even if the corporation manages to stay in existence for some
number of periods i, there, is always the possibility that it will be bankrupted in period
i +1 if the generation, i +1 consumer refuses—for whatever reason—to buy the corporation's
shares. , . ...
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Samuelson (1958, pp. 480-482) discusses at some length the potential usefulness of social
compacts for enhancing socialwelfare in situations characterized by a "prisoner's dilemma."
Roughly described, a prisoner's dilemma occurs when all agents are better off if all agents
cooperate rather than mutually defect, yet it is always privately rational for individual agents
to defect. This is the type of dilemma that undermines the viability of the private corporation
introduced in the current context. Even if all consumers are potentially better off with the
corporation in existence, each individual consumer always perceives a private advantage to
be gained by "defecting" from the existing corporation and starting a new one.
Note, however, that this same dilemma undermines the viabihty of fiat money. An agent
might anticipate that a wealth windfall could be obtained by refusing to accept the fiat
money currentlyin use, and by instead issuing a new form offiat money. It was this fragility
of flat money that motivated the discussion by Samuelson (1958) regarding the significance
ofsocial compacts. By agreeing to accept fiat money issued by government as "legal tender"
in exchange for goods, private agents make it possible for this fiat money to act as a store
of value and hence also as a mediumof exchange. As noted by Bryant (1981), a violation of
this social compact could lead to the demise of fiat money in any form.
This leads to a simple but important point: An organization will be able to incur and roll
over debt from one period to the next if and only if it obtains and maintains the confidence
of savers. In the model presented here, the confidence that savers have in fiat money allows
the government to incur and roll over a debt, while the confidence that savers have in share
values allows a corporation to incur and roll over a debt. If confidence is lost in either
financial a^set for whatever reason, then the ability to roll over debt is lost.
In reality, a variety of laws and regulations have been created to help citizens maintain
confidence in debt instruments. Chartering and other types of regulations restrict the is
suance of unsecured debt, just as various regulations protect government's monopoly over
the issue of fiat money. As noted by Kaufman (1992, p. 296), among the requirements typi
cally included for obtaining a commercial bank charter is a demonstration that the services
proposed by the applicant are needed and will not endanger the solvency of other similar
14
financial institutions.'
In this paper we abstract from the issues of entry and confidence. Of course, the neg
ative net worth position of our corporate intermediary might indeed make the default risk
associated with our corporation's stock higher than'that, associated with a fiat money issued
and protected by a government. Nevertheless, we are primarily concerned with the efficiency
implications of government intermediation through fiat money versus private intermediation
through a corporation. For comparison purposes, it seems reasonable to begin—as we do
here—by examining the case where confidence is maintained in both assets and where both
assets are protected from threat of entry. This allows us to explore whether or not a pri
vate earnings-driven intermediary can in •principle enhance the efficiency of a monetarized
economy. Once this basic understanding is obtained, we can proceed.to extend our model
by recognizing differences in risk and by exploring the extent to wHch social welfare might
be improved through the regulation of private intermediaries.
5. Equilibrium in the Corporate Economy
As discussed in section 3, the assumption that the corporation has structurally rational
share demand expectations implies the non-viability of any prospectus with a zero share
price Vt and a positive subsequent share price Ui+i or a positive share price Vt and a zero
subsequent share price Ui+i. Also, as will be clarified in section 6 (Propositions 6.5 and 6.8),
the optimizing corporation will select the null prospectus with uniformly zero share prices
if and only if the initial real money supply happens to equal the particular level needed to
achieve a Pareto efficient outcome in the absence of the corporation.
Consequently, for expositional simplicity, the following definition of a Corporate Econ
omy equilibrium focuses on those cases in which the optimizing private corporation plays a
nontrivial role in the economy through strictly positive share price announcements.
» * I /
Definition 5.1. Given an initial level of money balances Mq > 0 and an initial level of
share holdings ^ vector
e(Mo,0o) = (c,M,0,^^I,P) (14)
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consisting ofa consumption allocation c = (c°, (cj, cj), {c\, C2),...), a nominal money demand
sequence M = (Mi, M2, share demand sequence $ = (^1, ^2, •••)? ^ corporate expected
share demand sequence ^ corporate prospectus I = (v,d®) with v > 0,
and a nominal goods price sequence P = {Pi^P2,...) is an equilibrium for the Corporate
Economy, conditional on Mq and 60, if it satisfies the following five conditions:
• Positive Nominal Goods Prices: 0 < Pf for each < > 1.
• Consumer Optimization: Consumer demands for goods, money, and shares consti
tute finite-valued solutions to the generation 0 consumer's budget constraint (8) and
the lifetime utility maximization problem (2) for each t >1.
• Corporate Optimization: The prospectus I is an element of the corporation's opti
mal choice set X(P).
• Market Clearing for Goods and Money: For each t> I,
; (15)
Mt-i > Mt . (16)
• Fulfilled Share and Dividend Expectations: For each t > I, 0^ = 9t and =
vt[6i - 9t-i]/6t-i-
The first condition is a non-primitive restriction that excludes equilibriawith zeronominal
goods prices, although it does permit the price of money, l/Pt^ to be zero in finite time. In
the latter case, only shares can be used to store value. The consumer optimization condition
ensures that each .consumer is maximizing his utility, conditional on expected prices and
dividends, and the corporate optimization condition ensures that the corporation is acting
in accordance with the interests of its shareholders.
The goods market clearing condition (15) ensures the feasibility of the equilibrium con
sumption allocation. The money market clearing condition (16) ensures that the demand
for money in period t does not exceed the supply, which is given by the amount ofmoney
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held by the generation f —1 old agent. Recall that government only issues money in .period
1. The absence of a market clearing condition for shares implies that the corporation can
freely issue new shares in each period t. Consequently, the number of shares 6t-i which the
generation t~l old consumer redeems in period t places no direct restriction on the number
of shares 6^ that can,be issued,to the generation t young consumer.
The final condition ensures that the corporation's share demand and dividend expecta
tions are correct. • • i.
6. Efficiency and Dynamic Properties
K the corporation is ehminated from the Corporate Economy, i.e., if share prices and
expected dividend distributions are simply constrained to be zero, then the Corporate Econ
omy reduces to the basic monetary OG economy. The no-trade outcome in which money is
without value and each consumer in each period t simply consumes his own endowment can
be supported as a competitive equilibrium for the latter economy; and, given the regularity
condition (1), this no-trade outcome is not Pareto efficient [Gale (1973)]. How is the econ
omy affected by the introduction of a private,'earnings-driven, price-setting corporation that
issues and rolls over debt?
To begin the analysis of this question, consider the summation of the young age budget
constraint of the generation t consumer and the old age budget constraint of the generation
i —l consumer. Assuming that dividend expectations are fulfilled, one obtains
0' = - c°] + [Mt-i - Mt]/Pt , t>l. (17)
The market clearing conditions (15) and (16) for goods and money then imply that
0 = + , t> 1; • (18)
0 = , t>l. (19)
Recalling that the generation t savings level is defined by St = —c\ for each i > 1, it
follows from the budget constraint (6) and the goods market clearing condition (18) that
'^t+i = ^ ^ 1 • (20)
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Moreover, since share prices are positive in any Corporate Economy equilibrium, the first
order condition (3) applies and can be expressed as
MRSiw" - St, UJ" + qtst) = i > 1 . (21)
Given a value for the initial share rate of return gi, relations (20) and (21) determine all
possible equilibrium paths for $t and qt.
In the following subsections the efficiency and dynamic properties of Corporate Economy
equihbria are examined, first under the assumption that consumer preferences exhibit gross
substitutabiUty, and then without this assumption. The next two propositions will be useful
for this purpose. The first proposition estabhshes a uniform positive lower bound on the
share rates of return in any Corporate Economy equilibrium.
Proposition 6.1. In any Corporate Economy equilibrium, the share rates of return qt
satisfy qt > MRS(w^^w°) for
Recalling Proposition 2.1, it follows from Proposition 6.1 that all young consumers in a
Corporate Economy equilibrium choose nonnegative savings levels Sj. The next proposition
relies on the well-known Cass-Balasko-Shell "transversality condition" elaborated in Balasko
and Shell (1980, Prop. 5.6, p. 296) to obtain a general characterization of Pareto inefficient
consumption allocations for the Corporate Economy in terms of the long-run behavior of
these savings levels.
Proposition 6.2. Lete{Mo,6o) = (c,M, I, P) denote an equilibrium for the Corpo
rate Economy. Suppose the equilibrium consumption profiles (c?, Ci^.i) are uniformly bounded
above and below by strictly positive vectors. Then c is a Pareto inefficient consumption
allocation if and only if lim(_oo = 0, where St = —cf .
6.A Efficieiicy and Dynamic Properties Under Gross SubstitutabiUty
As established in Proposition 2.1, the optimal savings level ofeach consumer is uniquely
determined as a function s{q) of the share rate of return q for each g > 0. Suppose the
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preferences of consumers in the'Corporate Economy' satisfy gross substitutability, in the
sense that 5(5) is a strictly increasing function of q. In this case, each optimal savings level
is supported by a unique rate of return, and at most one equilibrium path for qt and St is
associated with each initial rate of return qi. As shown in Figure 1, the offer curve for the
generation t consumer is everj^here negatiyely sloped.
In any stationary-structured OG economy such as the Corporate Economy, the "golden
rule" rate of return is defined to be the'stationary rate of return g .that supports the highest
possible lifetime utility for a representative consumer. As shown by Samuelson (1958), this
rate of return (in gross terms) coincides with 1 plus the population growth rate g, where
g is assumed to be zero for the Corporate Economy. The golden rule consumption profile
and savings level supported by the Corporate Economy golden rule rate of return ^ = 1
are depicted in Figure 1 as c = (?',c®) and s,= —c^, respectively. Given the regularity
conditions imposed on preferences in section 2, g = 1 is strictly greater than MRS(w^^w'^ ),
and c^, c", and s are necessarily positive. Consequently, it follows from Proposition 6.2 that
any Corporate Economy equilibrium supported by the stationary golden rule rate of return
q ~ 1 is Pareto efficient.
Do any such equilibria exist? The next propositionprovides a first step toward answering
this question.
Proposition 6.3. Given givss substitutability, in any Corporate Economy equilibrium
the optimizing'corporation must set q^ = I. •
As seen in the appendix proof of this proposition, qi > I violates the assumption that
the corporation chooses a corporate plan it perceives to be viable, and 91 < 1 violates the
assumption that the corporation acts in the best interests of its shareholders. This raises two
new questions. Do any Corporate Economy equilibria exist that support the initial share
rate of return q^ = 1? If so, what are their efficiency properties? The following proposition
answers both of these questions.
Proposition 6.4. Given gross substitutability, the only possible Corporate Economy
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equilibria are the Pareto efficient golden rule equilibria supported by qt = I for all t > 1; and
the set of such equilibria is not empty.
Proposition 6.4 shows that the corporation has a dramatic impact on the efficiency and
dynamic properties of the Corporate Economy. Assuming gross substitutability, the economy
has a unique equilibrium consumption allocation: namely, the Pareto efficient golden rule
consumption allocation characterized by the stationary consumption profile c, as depicted
in Figure 1. As seen in the appendix proof of Proposition 6.4, this unique equilibrium
consumption allocation can be supported by Corporate Economy equiUbria entailing different
corporate plans I, money demand sequences M, share demand sequences 0, expected share
demand sequences and price sequences P.
In contrast. Gale (1973) estabhshes that the basic monetary OG economy with preferences
satisfying gross substitutability and regularity condition (1) has infinitely many equilibrium
consumption allocations. Only one of these consumption allocations—the golden rule con
sumption allocation supported by the stationary rate of return q = 1—is Pareto efficient. All
other equilibrium consumption allocations are Pareto inefficient, and are associated with ini
tial rates of return that are less than one. In the Corporate Economy an initial rate of return
less than one on both money and shares gives the corporation an opportunity to increase
the welfare of each of its shareholders by raising the initial rate of return on shares and by
increasing its issue of unsecured debt. However, active private financial intermediaries are
missing in the basic monetary OG economy, hence the potential profit opportunities arising
from intermediation can remain unexploited.
Proposition 6.4 also raises another interesting point—the fundamental trade-ofF between
efficiency and stabihty in both the Corporate Economy and the basic monetary OG econ
omy. Assuming gross substitutability, the setting of an initial rate of return exceeding one
ultimately results in insolvency for either economy. For example, making repeated use of
relation (20) and gross substitutability, a simple induction argument establishes that the
optimal savings sequence (5() for the Corporate Economy must diverge to +oo if qi > 1,
implying that the finite resources + lo® available in the economy in each period t are
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exceeded in finite time. The drive of an active earnings-driven corporation to enhance the
welfare of its shareholders pushes the initial rate of return to 51 = 1. This increases efficiency,
but it also pushes the economy to the brink of collapse. Similarly, for the basicmonetary OG
economy, a government monetary policy designed to achieve efficiency would (if possible)
set the initial rate of return on money to one, and hence bring the economy to the brink of
collapse as well.
Although the set of possibleCorporate Economy equilibria exhibits a considerable degree
of indeterminacy with regard to the setting of nominal variables, some interesting inferences
can be drawn from the finding in Proposition 6.4 that the equilibrium wealth windfall of the
generation 0 old consumer, Mo/Pi + [ui + d\]OQ^ must equal the golden rule savings level, s.
Since [vi + ^ 0? this relation implies that the initial real money supply, Mq/A, cannot
exceed s in equihbrium. As the next proposition shows, the corporation has a viable way to
enter the economy if and only if Mo/Pi < s.
Proposition 6.5. Let Mq > 0 and $0 > 0 be given, and suppose consumer preferences
satisfy gross substitutability. Then in order for a Corporate Economy equilibrium e(Mo,;^o) ^0
exist, the nominal goods prices (i^, jp2,...) must satisfy Mo/A < ^ o-f^d Pt = P^+i for all t >
1. Conversely, given any such prices, there exists a Corporate Economy equilibrium e(Mo, ^0)
that generates these prices; and the market value of the corporation in this equilibrium is given
by vtOt = [5 —Mq/Pi] > 0 in each period / > 1.
Consequently^ if preferences exhibit gross substitutability, then government can prevent
the viable entry of a private corporation issuing unsecured debt if it can set the initial real
money supply equal to the golden rule level Mq/Pi = s. In this special case the Pareto
efficient golden rule outcome is^achieved without the need of a private intermediary. On the
other hand, if the initial real money supply is below this golden rule level for any reason, then
a profit opportunity exists in the'economy that can be exploited by the-entry of a private
intermediary willing to issue and forever roll over positively-priced unsecured debt.
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6.B Efficiency and Dynamic Properties Without Gross Substitutability
Suppose, instead, that consumer preferences fail to satisfy gross substitutability. The
optimal consumption and savings levels of each consumer are still uniquely determined as
functions (0^(9),c®(g), s(^)) of the rate of return q for each 5 > 0. However, the absence
of gross substitutability implies that there exist savings levels s-t for which the first order
condition (21) determines at least two possible supporting rates of return qt. Consequently,
the mapping from q to s{q) is not one-to-one and the offer curve of each consumer bends back
upon itself at least once, as illustrated in Figure 2. It follows that more than one equilibrium
path can be associated with an initial rate of return qi.
In view of the potential complications caused by this indeterminacy of equilibrium paths,
most researchers using the OG framework have assumed gross substitutability. An important
exception is Grandmont (1985), who relies on the absence of gross substitutabiHty to obtain
an endogenous competitive business cycle. Here we establish various efficiency properties for
the Corporate Economy in the absence of gross substitutabihty.
By assumption (1), the offer curve of each consumer has a slope —MRS{w^,w°) > —1
at the endowment point implying that the optimal savings level s{q) is a positive
and increasing function of q for sufficiently small q > MRS{w'^ ^w°). Suppose that the offer
curve of each consumer is as depicted in Figure 2. More precisely, suppose that the offer
curve bends back upon itself only once, that the bend point is supported by a rate of return
q" that is strictly less than one and strictly greater than MRS{w'^that the optimal
old-age consumption level c°{q) imphed by this offer curve is a strictly increasing function
of q for all q > MRS[w^^w°) and satisfies hm5_+oo c°{q) = -|-oo. Given these restrictions on
the offer curve of each consumer, the Corporate Economy in the absence of the corporation
essentially reduces to the basic monetary OG economy studied by Grandmont (1985).
To understand more clearly what is depicted in Figure 2, suppose q = (91,^25 •••) is an
equilibrium sequence ofreturn rates. Given any point Aon the offer curve in Figure 2 associ
ated with the equilibrium savings level s(qt) = - c^{qt) for the young consumer in period
t, note that the projection of A onto the vertical axis gives the equilibrium consumption
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level = c°{qt) = w° -\- qts(qt) for the old consumer in period i + 1. Moving horizontally
from A to the point B leaves the old age consumption level unchanged. However, because
point B is on a line with a slope equal -to -Ij it follows from the goods market clearing
condition (18) that the projection of B onto the horizontal axis must yield the equilibrium
consumption level •^w° —c°{qt) for the young consumer in period
The equilibrium savings level s(qt^i) for the young consumer in period t + l ,is then given by
the distance —c^(9«+i), which by construction equals qts(qt)- This is simply a geometric
illustration of condition (20), shown earlier to be a necessary condition for equilibrium.
Let Sjnax denote the maximum possible level for the consumer's optimal savings, achieved
at the first and only bend point in the offer curve. By assumption, this maximum savings
level is supported by the rate of return q", i.e., s^nax = ^(1*)- Note that s^nax in Figure 2
is associated with a rate of return qmax through the relation Smax = Qmax^{<}max)' Recalling
(20), this relation has the following interpretation: given the rate of return q„iax in some
period t, the equiUbrium savings level for period i + 1 is s^ax- For later purposes, various
properties of Smax and qmax depicted in Figure 2 will now be established analytically.
Proposition 6.6. Suppose the offer curve of the consumer bends hack upon itself ex
actly once, at a point supported by a rate of return q* satisfying MRS{w^^w^) < q* < I,
and that the optimal old-age consumption level c°(q) is a strictly increasing function of q
for all q > MRS{w^,w'') and satisfies limg^+co c°(^) = +oo. Then s < Smax < o.nd
there exists a unique solution qmax to the equation Smax = qs{q), where qmax > 1- More
over, in any Corporate Economy equilibrium the share rates of return qt lie in the interval
MRS{w^,w°)^qmax], o-nd the consumption profiles (cS',c°^i) are uniformly hounded above
and below by strictly positive vectors'.
Proposition 6.6 can now be used to establish a first welfare theorem for the Corporate
Economy in the absence of gross substitutability. In particular, given the assumptions of
Proposition 6.6, if any Corporate Economy equilibrium/a^7e^^ to be Pareto efficient, then the
equihbrium savings levels St would have to converge to zero. As detailed in the appendix
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proof of the next result, however, the corporation could then select and implement a vi
able alternative prospectus that increases the utility of every consumer—specifically, that
increases the windfall return of the generation 0 old consumer and increases the share rate of
return qt for all consumers in subsequent generations t—thus contradicting the maintained
assumption that the economy was originally in a Corporate Economy equilibrium.
Proposition 6,7. Under the assumptions of Proposition 6.6, all Corporate Economy
equilibria are Pareto efficient.
Several important questions still need to be addressed: Do equilibria necessarily exist
for the Corporate Economy in the absence of gross substitutability? If so, what dynamic
properties do they exhibit?
The next proposition establishes that equilibria do exist, given the assumptions of Propo
sition 6.6 and an additional restriction on the curvature of the upper branch of the offer curve.
Moreover, the equilibrium paths of all real variables are uniquely determined. Interestingly,
in the absence of the additional curvature restriction, the optimizing corporation may ex
hibit time inconsistent behavior—i.e., a desire in some period t > 1 to veer away from the
prospectus announced in period 1 in order to improve the welfare of its shareholders. We
shall return to this point at the end of this section.
Proposition 6.8. Suppose the assumptions of Proposition 6.6 hold. In addition, suppose
the degree to which the offer curve bends pack upon itself is sufficiently modest, in the sense
that
> llq' • (22)
Then there exist infinitely many Corporate Economy equilibria; but all of these equilibria
entail the same real equilibrium solution values for consumption levels, savings levels, and
share rates of return. In particular, in any Corporate Economy equilibrium, the optimizing
corporation sets qi = q"; and all equilibrium share rates of return qt lie in the interval
Q'l^max]} implying that the economy is always on the upper branch of the offer curve.
As detailed in the appendix proof of Proposition 6.8, the unique equilibrium share rates
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of, return and savings levels for the-Corporate Economy are given by the solution values q*
and.^J for the differential system-(20) and (21.)j starting,from.theparticular initial share rate
of return = g*, and using the "selection principle" implied by the optimizing behavior of
the corporation that the highest possible share rate of return is always to be selected when
multiple solutions are possible. .On the hand,-equilibrium nominal prices are nonunique.
Specifically, any nominal price sequenceigenerated by P* = [qt-i ••• A* each t > 2,
with Pi satisfying 0 < Mq/Pi. < Sjnax^ constitutes,an equilibrium nominal price sequence.
An informal summary-of the appendix proof for Proposition 6.8 will now be sketched.
Although heuristic, it may help to clarify why .the presence of the optimizing corporation
ensures the determination of a unique real equihbrium outcome, despite the existence of a
backward-bending offer curve. , • . .
Let Mq and 6o be any given positive values for the money and' share holdings of the
generation 0 consumer. In any Corporate Economy equihbrium the windfall return of the
generation 0 consumer, Mq!Pi + [ui+ niust equal the savings level.of the generation
1 consumer. Given the assumptions of .Proposition 6.6, the maximum possible value for
IS ^TTiax* '
Let Pi denote any positive (possibly infinite) nominal price level for period 1 that satisfies
0 < Mq/Pi < Smax- Then, taking Mq/P^ and as given, it follows from the definition of
a Corporate Economy equilibrium that,-the optimizing corporation sets [ui + d\] in period
1 so that the windfall return of the generation 0 -consumer is equal to s^ax- Given this
promised windfall to the generation 0 consumer, the highest feasible rate of return that the
corporation can offer to the generation 1 consumer is q^ = q*^ resulting in the savings level
5* = s{q*) = Smax', for Setting any higher rate of"returnwould result in a lower savings level,
and the corporation would not be able to fulfill its contractual obligations to the generation
0 consumer.
By relation (20), the equilibrium savings level for period 2 must then be given by =
9i^(9i) < ^max- The restriction (22) implies that > s[qmax)- Consequently, as depicted in
Figure 2, two possible rates of return q2 support the savings level 5^—that is, two possible
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rates of return q2 satisfy relation (21) for the given sj—^and neither of these rates of return
exceeds qmax- It follows from the definition of a Corporate Economy equilibrium, however,
that the optimizing corporation always chooses the highest possible rate of return for each
successive generation. The economy thus moves along the upper branch of the offer curve,
the branch that passes through the golden rule consumption point c.
Continuing this line of reasoning, the equilibrium savings levels s* and rates of return
q*, and hence also the equiUbrium consumption levels cj'* and c^^j, are uniquely determined
by successive applications of relations (20) and (21), together with the selection principle
that the highest possible rate of return is always to be chosen. The regularity condition (22)
guarantees that the rates of return q1[ all lie in the interval [g*, qmax]^ hence the economy
remains on the upper branch of the offer curve for all periods t >1.
As shown in the detailed appendix proof of Proposition 6.8, infinitely many Corporate
Economy equilibria can be constructed to support this unique real equilibrium solution
for consumption, savings, and share rates of return. One source of indeterminacy is the
degree of freedom the corporation has to realize the rates of return q* either in the form
of share price appreciation or in the form of dividend distributions. Another source of
indeterminacy is the setting of the initial real money balance Mo/Pj*. In analogy to the'case
of gross substitutability, the corporation is viable as long as this initial real money balance
is strictly less than Smax-, the maximum possible level for consumer savings; for this permits
the corporation to issue and roll over positively valued shares in each period t >1.
What dynamic properties are exhibited by the unique real equilibrium solution for the
Corporate Economy in the absence ofgross substitutability? The next proposition establishes
that only three relatively simple types of dynamic behavior are possible.
Proposition 6.9. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 6.8, only three types of dynamic
behavior are possible for the rate of return sequence {q*) in any Corporate Economy equilib
rium: either (a) condition (22) holds as an equality and the sequence (q*) cycles hack and
forth between q' and qj^ax « period 2 orbit, starting with q^ = q"; or (b) condition (22)
holds as a strict inequality and the sequence {q^) converges to a limit cycle supported by a
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period 2 orbit {qL,qu} q* < qi < I < qu < qmax o.nd qiqu = 1/ or (c) condition (22)
holds as a strict inequality and the sequence (gf), converges cyclically to the golden rule rate
of return q = 1.
In summary, under the hypotheses of Proposition 6.8, an equihbrium path for the Corpo
rate Economy either exhibits a deterministic and eiidogenously'generated period 2 "business
cycle" or converges cyclically to the golden rule consumption allocation. In either case,
however, it follows from Proposition 6.7 that the equilibrium path is Pareto efficient.
If condition (22) does not hold, implying that q*s{q*) < s{qmax)y then the Corporate
Economy may have no equilibria satisfying Definition 5.1. Roughly stated, the difficulty is
that the corporation may wish to re-optimize its initial period 1 prospectus at some later
time i > 1 in order .to improve the welfare of its subsequent shareholders; but Definition
5.1 does not permit re-optimization. Moreover, even if re-optimization were permitted, this
would not fully resolve the resulting time inconsistency problem.
To see the problem, recall that it is, always in the best interest of the generation 0
shareholder if the corporation sets gj = q" in -period 1 to ensure that the generation 1
shareholder saves the maximum amount ^(g*) = Smax-. The consumer; .budget constraints
and the product market clearing condition embodied in condition (20) then imply that the
savings level ^2 of the generation 2 shareholder must equal q''s{q*).
Two different rates of return 92 support the savings level 52 = q*s{q'') in period
2, with ?2 < 9* < 1 the regularity condition (22) fails to hold, however, the higher
rate of return exceeds qmax ^^d is^ thus not feasible by Proposition 6.6. Suppose, then,
that the corporation in period 1 announces a prospectus with a first period rate of return q*
and a second period rate of return q'2.
The period 1 rate of return q" ensures that the generation 1 shareholder chooses the
maximum possible savings level and hence that the generation 0 old shareholder receives the
maximum possible windfall return. Once period 2 is,actually reached, however, the rate of
return ^3 is not in the best interest ofeither the generation 1 old shareholder or the generation
2young shareholder. Rather, these shareholders would best be served if the corporation were
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now to increase 52 to q*. This change is feasible and would generate the maximum savings
level from the generation 2 young shareholder and hence an unexpected windfall return
for the generation 1 old shareholder. Unfortunately, if the generation 1 young shareholder
perceives a positive probability that he will receive a windfall return from the corporation
in period 2—i.e., a return above and beyond the return generated by the dividend and/or
share price appreciation promised in the initial prospectus—then he might lower his savings
level in period 1 below Smaxi making the generation 0 old shareholder worse off.
In short, to handle a modified definition of equihbrium under which re-optimization is
permitted, more detail would have to be added to the model concerning how the consumers
behave in the uncertain environment created by the possibility of time inconsistent corporate
choice.
7. Conclusion
Trade and credit arrangements in modern market economies are primarily accomplished
through earnings-driven private intermediaries such as retail stores, banks, and brokerage
firms. Understanding how private intermediaries affect the allocation of resources is therefore
of considerable importance. The findings of this paper suggest that the inclusion of private
intermediaries is essential for the study of efficiency in OG economies, even in the absence
of transactions costs and asymmetric information problems. In particular, it is shown that a
first welfare theorem can be recovered for the basic monetary OG economy if the economy is
generalized to encompass a corporate intermediary that maximizes its market value in direct
accordance with the interests of its successive shareholders.
Further work is.of course needed to check the robustness of these findings. One important
issue is the degree of market power exercised by private intermediaries. In this paper it is as
sumed that the corporate intermediary exercises control over both its dividend distributions
and its share prices, which in turn determine the equilibrium interest rates for the economy.
Because of product differentiation, chartering restrictions, and so forth, actual financial in
termediaries often do exercise some market power in setting rates of return for local deposits
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and loans [Hannan and Berger (1991)], but the intermediary may be too small relative to
the securities market to influence its marginal funding costs and its marginal earnings on
other financial assets such as large-denomination CD's [Fama (1985)].
The issue of market .power is closely tied to the issue of entry. Empirical findings suggest
that chartering and other restrictions currently in force do reduce initial entry into financial
markets [Amel and Liang (1992)], but the special features of financial intermediaries that
might warrant such particular forms of supervision are still under debate. Nearly all argu
ments for the regulation of private financial intermediaries to date have been based on the
beliefthat information problems are particularly severe in financial markets [Gertler (1988),
Williamson (1992)]. This paper suggests that some form of initial entry deterrence may
be necessary to ensure the long-run viability of private financial intermediaries, even in the
absence of information problems; but complete deterrence resulting in a sole reliance on fi
nancial assets passively supplied by government to coordinate trade and credit will generally
be inefficient.
Another interesting area for future research concerns the relationship between efficiency
and private intermediation in economies with capital accumulation. Pingle and Tesfatsion
(1994) show that the inclusion of a private earnings-driven corporate intermediary can elim
inate the inefficiency that arises in the one-sector growth model studied by Diamond (1965)
and Tirole (1985). Still unresolved, however, is whether private intermediation allevicLtes the
"inadequate distribution of capital among firms" described by Malinvaud (1953) that can
arise in multi-sector growth models when the production decisions of individual firms result
in aggregate capital overaccumulation.
Finally, Grandmont (1985) stresses the importance of taking due account of learning
when formulating the dynamics of an economy. In particular, he establishes for the basic
monetary 00 economy that the stability properties of equilibria depend on the processes that
agents use to form their price expectations; and this point is surely relevant for the Corporate
Economy as well. Interestingly, as seen in section 6, another type of learning problem also
arises for the Corporate Economy: namely, in the absence of gross substitutability, it can
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happen that the corporate intermediary will face a time inconsistency problem. That is, in
some period t > 1 the corporate intermediary might desire to deviate from the corporate
plan it announced in period 1 in order to increase the welfare of its current and future
shareholders. In this case the dynamic path of the economy cannot be determined without
a more fully articulated modeling of consumer decision making in the face of uncertain
corporate behavior.
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Appendix: Proposition Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Suppose < -f-oo. The budget constraints for problem (2)
can then be written as
Ct = - St ; (23)
Mf
<+i = - gt], (24)
•n
where = [Pf/Pi^i] denotes the gross rate of return on holding money from period t to
If > Qi, it is apparent from (24) that the generation t consumer would desire to sell
shares short without bound in his youth in order to finance the acquisition of an arbitrarily
large holding of money. Consequently, in order for problem (2) to have a finite solution when
Pt < +CO, it is necessary that rj < gf.
If Pt < +00 and < qt, the young consumer in generation t will choose not to hold money
(i.e., Mf = 0), and the optimal consumption and savings levels of the generation t consumer
will be uniquely determined as functions of qt by the relations (3), (5), and (6). If Pt < +oo
and Tf = qt^ the generation t young consumer will be indifferent between holding shares and
holding money. In this case the particular levels of Mt and 6t will be indeterminate, but the
optimal consumption and savings levels of the generation t consumer will again be uniquely
determined as functions of qt by relations (3), (5), and (6).
In summary, if Pt < oo, then a finite solution exists for problem (2) if and only if either
ft < qt (implying Mt = 0) or rt = qt- In either case the budget constraints (23) and
(24) reduce to (5) and (6) and the optimal consumption and savings levels are uniquely
determined as functions of qt. Moreover, it follows from the regularity condition (1) that
•s(g() > 0 if and only if qt > MRS{w^^w").
Suppose, instead, that Pt and Pt+i are both infinite. Then the real money balances of
the generation t consumer are zero-valued regardless of his choice of nominal money holdings
Mf Consequently, the budget constraints (23) and (24) once again reduce to (5) and (6),
and the remaining assertions of Proposition 2.1 follow as for the case Pt < oo. Finally,
if Pt = -}-oo and Pt+i < +oo, then problem (2) has no solution since the generation t con
sumer will desire to hold an arbitrarily large amount of (costless) money in period t. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. By Proposition 2.1, s(q) > 0 if and only if g > MRS{w^^w°).
Suppose there exists a Corporate Economy equilibrium in which the share rate of return qt
first falls below MRS{wy,w°) in some period t* > I. The generation t* young consumer
would then plan to borrow rather than to save, i.e., cf. > w^. But the planned optimal
savings of the generation t* —1 old consumer are nonnegative, implying that c°, >
since either this consumer is the initial old consumer or he faced a share rate of return
Qr-i ^ MRS[w^in period t* —1. The goods market clearing condition (18) thus fails
for period t*. It must therefore hold that qt > MRS{w^,w°) for all i > 1. Q.E.D.
• Proof of. Proposition 6.2. Let pt = [qt-i •••?i]"^ > 0 denote the real price of good
1 measured in units of good t, t >2, with pi = 1. Then pt+i = [l/<it]Ptj where it follows
from Proposition 6.1 that qt is uniformly bounded from below by the positive constant
MRS{wy, w°) for all t>l. It is then straightforward to show that Property G in Proposition
5.6 ofBalaskoand Shell (1980) is satisfied. -Recallfrom Section2 that Properties C and C in
Proposition 5.6, ensuring that the indifference curves generated by ,the utility function ^7(-)
do not come arbitrarily close to being kinked or hnear, are assumed to hold as well. Thus,
applying this proposition to the Corporate Economy—a special case of the Balasko-Shell pure
exchange model in terms of the structural specifications for preferences, real, endowments,
and technology (nonstorable resource)—the equilibrium consumption allocation c is Pareto
inefficient if and only if l/pt < +oo. ... , ,
Since the optimal savings levels St are bounded between 0 and t£j^ 'for qt > MRS(w^, w°),
either lirnsup^t = 0 or limsupsf > 0. Suppose limsups^ > 0. From condition (20), Sf+i =
pt/pt+i]st for aU t.> 1, implying that —\pi/pt]si for all t > I. If 5i = 0, then St —0
for all t > 1, contradicting the supposition. Therefore, si > 0. If limt_+oo[l/p«] —0, then
limt_»+oo = 0 again contradicting the supposition. Therefore ESf does not converge
as T ^ +00. Because Pf > 0 for all f > 1, it follows that = +oo. .
Conversely, suppose limsup^f ,= 0, which ,in turn implies that-lim sup cf = and
Iimsupc°^.i = w°. It follows from the regularity condition (1) that, for sufficiently small e
in (0,1), there exists a period k such that p^lp^^^ = MRS(^CtyCt^i) < .[1 —e] for all t > k.
Defining,= l/pt = Pt — ~ t>k. Thus, l/pt
^ Pk/^ < +00. Finally, since'< +oo, it follows that 1/pt < +oo.
In summary, the equilibrium 'consumption allocation C' is Pareto inefficient if and only
if limsup5f = 0. However, > 0 for all i > 0 implies that limsupsf = 0 if and only if
lim(_o^5t'= 0. Q.E.D. , ' •
Proof of Proposition 6.3. Let a Corporate Economy equilibrium be given, character
ized by a rate of return sequence (qt). By Propositions 2.1 and 6.1, qt > MRS{w^,w°) and
Sf > 0 for each t > 1. '
Suppose qi > k for some A: > 1. Then gross substitutability implies > s and rela
tion (20) implies 52 > s^.. Knowing ,S2'> ^i-, gross substitutability implies q2 > qi. Making
repeated use of relation (20) and^gross substitutability, a simple induction argument then es
tablishes that qt+i > qt for alH > 1, hence qt^k for all i > 1. It follows from the expression
(13) for qt that > kvtO^ for alH > 1, which impHes that the sequence of expected
real share demands, diverges to +00. But this violates the section 3 assumption that
the optimizing corporation only chooses from among those prospectuses it perceives to be
viable—implying, in particular, that the prospectus must en^il a bounded sequence of ex
pected real share demands. Consequently, in any .Corporate Economy equilibrium., it cannot
be true that qi > 1. •< .i .
Suppose, instead, that MRS[w^,„w'^ ) < < 1. It will be shown that the corporation
could then increase the welfare of each of its shareholders by making a viable change in
n
its prospectus, a violation of the assumption that the corporation in any Corporate Econ
omy equilibrium chooses "a viable prospectus in accordance with the best interests of its
shareholders.
Suppose the corporation increases the share rate of return q\ to < 1 by increasing the
share price V2. The gross substitutability assumption implies that this increase in q\ leads
the generation 1 consumer to increase his savings level; i.e., Si > si. Also, taking the price
sequence (Pt) as given, the increase in gi would lead the generation t consumer to reduce his
money demand to zero (if it were not already zero); i.e., Mi = 0. This implies that the real
demand for shares would become V\B-i = Si. Since > Si and MijPi < Mi/Pi, it follows
from the generation 1 consumer's young age budget constraint that > Bi. This implies
that the dividend of the generation 0 consumer would increase from d\ = V\[Bi —0o]/^o to
= vi[Bi —Bq\IBq. Thus, the welfare of the generation 0 consumer is enhanced due to a
"windfall" dividend.
Because q\ > q\ and 5i > 5i as determined above, condition (20) implies that S2 > ^2
would also have to hold in order for the sequences (qt) and (s^) to be part of an equilibrium.
By gross substitutability, $2 > S2 implies 52 > 92- Continuing this line of reasoning, it is
seen that for all t > 1, > MRS{w^,w°). Suppose, then, that the corporation adjusts
its prospectus to generate these higher share rates of return qt, t > 1. Since the optimal
savings level of each consumer in the original equilibrium was nonnegative, it follows from
the budget constraints (5) and (6) that each consumer is strictly better olf. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.4. Recall that q = I is the golden-rule rate of return for the
Corporate Economy. By Proposition 6.3, qi must equal 1 in any Corporate Economy equi
librium. Given gj = 1, it follows by gross substitutability that Si must equal the golden-rule
savings level s. Also, relation (20) implies that ^2 = Si. Hence, applying gross substitutabil
ity once more, q2 = qi = I- A simple induction argument then gives qt = I and St = s for
all t > 1. Consequently, in any Corporate Economy equihbrium, the only possible real out
come is the Pareto efficient golden-rule outcome characterized by the stationary share rate
of return g = 1, the stationary savings level s for each young consumer, and the stationary
consumption levels and c° for each young and old consumer, respectively.
It will now be shown that there exists at least one Corporate Economy equilibrium that
supports this golden-rule outcome. Suppose that the sequence P = (Pi, P21...) of nominal
goods prices is a positive sequence satisfying
0 < Mq! P\ < 5 ; Pt = ^ ^ 1 • (25)
Taking this sequence of nominal goods prices as given, suppose the corporation selects the
prospectus I* defined as follows: the corporation sets = 0 for all <> 1, sets > 0 so that
ViOq = s —Mo/Pi, and sets Vt = Vi for all t >2. Note that the share rates of return impHed
by this prospectus satisfy = 1 for all i > 1 by definition (4).
Consider, first, the perceived viabiHty of the prospectus I*. Suppose the share demands
expected by the corporation under this prospectus are 0^ = ^0 for all t > 1. The real share
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demands' expected by the corporation' over time; then satisfy Vt9^ — viOq for allA > 1, a
bounded sequence. Also, by relation (11),. the net receipts expected by the corporation in
any period t are zero. Finally, zero expected net-'receipts in 'any period t implies a zero
expected dividend distribution, hence the prospectus I* exhibits dividend consistency. It
follows that there is a set of corporate expectations for share demands under which the
corporation wiU perceive the prospectus I*^to be viable.
What .about the optimality of the prospectus-I* from the viewpoint of the corporation?
Under this prospectus, qt = 1 for alii > 1. If-the corporation were to attempt to increase the
share rate of return' qt above 1 in any period t > 1, relation (13) implies that, the sequence
of real share demands expected by the corporation would become unbounded, a violation
of the viabiUty of the prospectus'. Consequently, by gross substitutability, the corporation
cannot increase, the savings level Si of the generation 1 young consumer above s, implying
that the corporation is maximizing the windfall return it can provide to the generation 0 old
consumer in period 1. In addition, the corporation is maximizing the share "rate of return
qt it can provide to the generation t young .consumer in each period t'> 1. Hence, the
corporation perceives the prospectus IT to be optimal.
What about consurner optimization? Given,gf-.= 1 for all t > 1, it follows from (5) and
(6) that each young consumer will choose to consume the golden-rule consumption profile
(c^,c°^.j) = (w^ —s^w° s) = (^jc"). Moreover, under the prospectus I*, the value of the
shares held by the generation 0 old consumer is Vi9q = ,s—Mq/Pi, and his expected dividend
is 0. It follows from the budget constraint (8) thatrthe generation 0 old consumer will choose
to consume cj — s = c^. • <
The above discussion establishes that, for positive nominal goods prices satisfying (25),
the consumer and corporate optimization conditions in the definition of a Corporate Economy
equilibriuni are satisfied if the corporation .sets the prospectus I* and has share demand
expectations 9^ = 9o for all t > ,1. But what about the remaining conditions requiring
market clearing for goods and money and fulfilled share and dividend expectations?
Given I", real outcomes must coincide with the golden-rule solution, and the goods market
clearing condition (15) holds by construction for this golden-rule solution. If Pi < +00, then
it follows from (25) that the money rate of return rt equals the share rate of return = 1
in each period t, implying that the consumer is indifferent between holding his optimal real
savings s in the form of money or shares. Without loss of generality, it can then be assumed
that Mt = Mo for all i > 1, implying that the money market clearing condition (16) is
satisfied. Alternatively, if Pi = +00, then it follows from (25) that Pt = +00 for all t > 1.
In this case money has no value and = 0 for all i > 1; but the money market clearing
condition (16) is clearly satisfied for all <> 1. In either case, VtOt = ViOq = s~ MqIPi for all
t > 1. But Vt = vi > 0 for all < > 2 under,prospectus I"", which forces 9t = ^0 for all t>\.
It follows .that the actual net, receipts (dividend payout) of the corporation,in each period t
are zero, exactly what the .corporation expects under prospectus I*. Also, the corporation's
expected share demands are fulfilled. - . . .
In summary, given gross substitutability, the.only possible Corporate. Economy equilibria
IV
are the Pareto efficient golden-rule equilibria supported by = 1 for all i > 1. And it has
been shown that at least one Corporate Economy equiHbrium exists for each nominal goods
price sequence satisfying (25). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.5. The necessity of having Mq!P-^ < ^ in equilibrium follows
from the fact that MqJ+ [ui + = 5 in equilibrium, as established in Proposition 6.4.
But, given Oq > 0, Mo/Pi = s would force [vi + d\\ = 0, a violation of the requirement that
> 0 and > 0. If Pi < +oo, it follows from the money market clearing condition (19)
that Ml = Mo > 0; but the period 1 young consumer will only be willing to hold a positive
amount of money in lieu of shares if ri = = 1, implying Pi = P2. A simple induction
argument then yields the necessity of having Pi - for every i > 1 in any equilibrium.
Conversely, if P\ —H-cc, no solution exists for the utility maximization problem (2) in period
1 unless P2 = -1-00; and a simple induction argument again yields the necessity of having Pt
=• +00 for all i > 1 in any equilibrium.
Given a nominal goods price sequence satisfying Mo/P] < s and Pt = for each <> 1,
together with gross substitutability, the proof of Proposition 6.4 establishes the existence of a
Corporate Economy equilibrium with the market value of the firm given by VtOt = s —Mq/Px
> 0 for each / > 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.6. The maximum optimal savings level must be strictly
less than for otherwise a consumer would choose to consume nothing when young when
faced with the rate of return <?', an impossibility given the restrictions on imposed in
section 2. Moreover, the regularity condition (1), together with the assumption of a unique
backward bend in the offer curve at (7* < 1, implies that = 'S(^*) is greater than the
golden rule savings level 5 = 5(1); see Figure 2.
Since qs{q) = c°{q) — is a strictly increasing function of q that takes on the value 0
at 9 = MRS(w^^10°) and diverges to +00 as 9 —» +00, the equation Smax = q^{q) has a
unique solution qmax > 0 for every Smax > 0- By definition of the rate of return q
must be greater than 1: for qmax < 1 would imply that 0 < = qmaxsiqmax) < s{q
S -Stnari ^ contradiction, and qmax = 1 would imply that Smax = another contradiction.
Also, no share rate of return qt > qmax can occur in any Corporate Economy equilibrium;
for this would imply that the equilibrium savings rate Sf+i = qis(qi) for period t + 1 exceeds
^inax —qTnaxsiqmax]^ ^ contradiction of the definition of Smax-
Since by assumption c^{q) is an increasing function of q, the finding qt < qm,ax, together
with the goods market clearing condition (18) and Proposition 6.1, imply that 0 < u;" =
C°{MRS{w^,w°)) < c°{qt) < c°{qjnax) < i > 1, in any Corporate Economy equi
librium; that is, the equilibrium old-age consumption levels are uniformly bounded above
and below by positive finite quantities. Finally, it follows from the goods market clearing
condition (18) and the finding that c^{qt) must satisfy 0 < t/j'' - < w'-' —s{qt)
= c^{qt) < i > 1; that is, the equilibrium young-age consumption levels are also
unifornnJy bounded above and below by positive finite quantities. Q.E.D.
max
max)
Proof of Proposition 6.7. Suppose there exists a Corporate Economy equilibrium for
which the consumption allocation is not Pareto efficient. By Propositions 6.2 and 6.6, the
sequence (5< : t = 1,2,...) of (nonnegative) equiUbriiim savings levels St must then converge
to zero. In-particular, given any e > 0, there exist at most finitely many periods t such that
St > e. • • 1' ,
Let e = s{qmax)/^ > 0. Then for each b < e the equation 5(g) = bhas only one solution
q{b) satisfying q{b) < Qmax-, and this solution satisfies 0-< q{by< q{t) < g-* < 1; seeFigure 2.
Let A: > 1 be such that the equiUbriiim savings levels satisfy Sn— si^qt) ^ e/2 for all t > k.
By Proposition 6.6, the equilibrium rates of return are uniformly bounded above by q^ax
and below by MRS(w^,w°). Hence, by choice of e, the equilibrium rate of return qt for any
period t > k must satisfy MRS{w^,w^) < qt < q{e) < q* < 1. It follows-from' (20) that the
(nonnegative) equilibrium savings rates St converge to 0 and the equilibrium rates of return
qt converge to MRS(w^\w'^) as i >cxd.
Suppose the corporation increases the rate of return from qt to q{e) < q* in each period
^ ^ by an announcement of new higher^ share prices (Of+i :t > k) satisfying = q(e)vt
for'all t > k^ with Vk = and an announcement of an increased expected dividend for
period k (derived below) and zero expected dividends for all periods t+1 with t > k. It will
now be shown that these changes in its prospectus would be perceived by the .corporation to
be viable changes that would benefit each of its shareholders, contradicting the assumption
that the economy was originally in a Corporate'Econoiny equilibrium. - '
By assumption, the optirn'al savings level-5(9) is a strictly increasing function of q for all
q < q'. The increase from qk to g(e) < q* in period k thus leads the generation k young
consumer to increase his savings level; i.e., > Sk- particular, since-the price sequence
P is taken as given,,the increase in q^ leads the generation k young consumer in period k to
reduce his money demand to zero (if it is not already zero) and to increase his real demand
for shares. .Recalling that this implies that Sk ~ VkOk > Sk — VkOk + MkjPk ^
VkOki hence 6k > 6k- It follows that, the expected dividend of the generation k —\ consumer
increases from d% = Vk[6k —Bk-\]l6k~\ to dl = Vk[h— Thus, the welfare of the
generation k—l consumer is enhanced diie to a "windfall" dividend. Moreover, the optimized
lifetime utility of each generation t consumer is an increasing function of the share rate of
return qt over the range qt > MRS('w'^ ^w°) where the consumer desires to save, hence the
change in prospectus benefits all consumers in generations t > k &s well. The welfare of
shareholders in any generations previous to A: —1 is unaffected.
Setting the share rate of return equal to the constant level q{e) < q' < I for all periods
t > k ensures by (13) that the real share demands expected by the corporation under* its
modified prospectus converge to zero over time, arid hence constitute a bounded sequence.
Moreover, expected profits for periods t > k are nonnegative. More precisely, as explained
above, the expected dividend (hence the expected amount of profit) for period k is strictly
increased from its original (nonnegative) equilibrium level; and, for any period t I with
t> k^ it follows from (11), (13), and,the specification of the new share,prices that expected
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profits take the form
= vt+i[0t+i - Ot] = Ot[^tq{e) - 5f+i] = 0 . (26)
Finally, it follows from (12) that dividend consistency holds as well.
In summary, the assumption that there exists a Corporate Economy equilibrium that
supports a Pareto inefficient consumption allocation has led to the contradictory conclu
sion that the criterion for corporate optimization appearing in the definition of a Corporate
Economyequilibrium—namely, I 6 2'(P)—is not satisfiedby this equilibrium. It follows that
any Corporate Economy equilibrium must support a Pareto efficient consumption allocation.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.8. Consider the sequential generation of savings and rate
of return sequences (sj") and (g^) by the relations (20) and (21), starting from the initial
condition = q", under the "selection principle" that the highest rate of return is always
to be chosen when multiple solutions are possible. It will first be shown (Lemma 2, below)
that, under the regularity condition (22), such sequences can be generated because the rates
of return q^ all lie in the interval [g*, qmaxli iniplying in turn that the savings levels s* all he
in the feasibly supported interval [^(gTnax)? ^(g*)], where s{q*) = s^ax-
Lemma 1. Condition (22) holds if and only ifq*s{q*) > s(qjnax)-
Proof of Lemma 1. By construction, Sjnax = ^{q*) = qmax^(qmax)^ where s{q*) and
^iqmax) are both strictly positive. Multiplying each side by g", the proof is immediate.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. Suppose condition (22) holds as a strict inequality. Then, for all periods
m> I and k >1, one has: (a) if q* < < gj < 1, then 1 < < q^+i < qmaxi o.nd (b)
if 1 < qf. < q^ < qmax} then q < < q^+i
Proof of Lemma 2. By assumption, the optimal old-age consumption level c'^ {q) =
+ qs(q) is a strictly increasing function of q over the interval q > q*, and the optimal
savings level s{q) is a strictly decreasing function of q over q > q*. Moreover, by (20),
s{q'^ i) = qt^iqt) for all t > 1. Hence the conditional statement in (a) implies that c°(q*)
< c°{q^) < c^{ql) < c°(l), which in turn implies—using (20), (22), and Lemma 1—that
s{qmax) < -3(9^1+1) < s{ql+i) < •s(l). The selection principle thenguarantees that the desired
conclusion in part (a) holds. Similarly, the conditional statement in part (b) impHes that
5(1) < s{ql^i) < i(gm+i) < 5mox, thus the selection principle guarantees that the desired
conclusion in part (b) holds. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. The rate of return q* lies in the interval [q'^ qmax] /or each t > 1. In
particular, if (22) holds as an equality, then ql € {q'',qmax} ^ ^ (f (^^) holds
as a strict inequality, then q* < gjf-i < 92t+i < 1 < ^ ^2t < ^max for all t>l.
Proof of Lemma 3. If q '^qmax = 1, implying that q's{q*) = s(q^ax), then the sequence
(q*) cycles back and forth between q* and q^ax in a simple period 2 orbit starting with gj =
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q'. To see this, note by (20) that, if = qmax in some period t, then the equilibrium savings
level for period t + lis Qmax^ilmax) = 'a savings level that is uniquely supported by the
share rate of return q". Conversely, if 5*'= q* in some period t, then the equihbrium savings
level for period i + 1 is q*s{q*) = s{qmax)' The rates of return qt thus cycle back and forth
between q* and qmax-
Suppose, instead, that q*qmax > 1? implying that q''s{q') > s{qmax)' By construction,
c°(gj) < c"; and all savings levels greater than s{q) are supported by rates of return that are
strictly smaller than g, for all 5(5) >; s{qmax)- Also, from (20), one has the goods market
clearing condition c°(q*) + ^^(^*+1) = -\-w^ for every <> 1. In particular, the golden rule
consumption profile satisfies this condition, implying that + c® = It then follows
from s{qmax) < qls(ql) = ^(qi) that q^ < qmax- And c''(g;^) + 0^(5^) = w'^w", with c°(qi) <
c°, implies that 0^(55) > ^ = c^(l); hence q^ > 1, for otherwise the selection principle used
in the construction of (q*) is violated. Thus, qi < I < q^ < qmax- To complete the proof, it
suffices to show that < gj < 1; for theii,'using 'Lemma 2, it follows by a simple induction
proof that q < 92f-i 92t+i 1 Q2t+2 ^2t ^max for all t ^ 1.
By assumption, c°{q) = w° qs{q) is a, strictly increasing function of q for all q >
MRS(w^,w°). Together with relation (20), and the earlier finding that q^ > 1, this impHes
that s(q^) = q2^{q2) > •^(l). But, by the restrictions.on the offer curve, all savings levels
greater than 5(1) are supported by rates of return less than 1; cf. Figure 2. In particular,
then, 53 < 1. Moreover, the selection principle guarantees that q^ > ql = q*- If 93 =
then 5(53) = 5(5") = Sjnax = ^max^(^max)- But this leads to a contradiction; for it holds by
(20) that 5(^3) = q2^{q2)i and it has been established above that q^ < q-maxi hence 5(53) <
Smax- It follows that ^-3 must be strictly greater'than gj". Q.E.D.
By Lemma 3, the savings and rate of return sequences (5J) and (g^*) constitute a feasible
real outcome for the Corporate Economy. For the reasons explained in the main text, under
the hypotheses of Proposition 6.6 any Corporate Economy equilibrium must support these
sequences. It will now be shown that there exist infinitely many such equilibria.
Let Mo and ^0 be any given positive values for the money and share holdings of the
generation 0 consumer, and let denote any positive (possibly infinite) nominal price level
for period 1 that satisfies 0 < Mq/P" < where by construction sj = s{q*) = s^ax- It
follows from (19) that the nominal price sequence must then be given by
p: =
1
p; , i > 2 , (27)
in order for the money market to clear in each period ^ > 1.
Taking the price sequence (P*) as given, suppose the corporation announces a prospectus
1= (v, d®) that is consistent with the following-requirements. The corporation announces a
period 1 share price > 0 and expected dividend > 0 -that satisfy
= K-Mo/A"] > 0. (28)
vin
This setting supports the maximum possible windfall return for the generation 0 consumer
in period 1. All remaining share prices > 0 and expected dividends > 0 are then
set so that they are consistent with the requirement
Vt
(29)
By construction, these settings yield the highest feasible share rate of return in each period
t > I. Finally, the real share demand 0^ expected by the corporation in each period i is
determined by
4 = Mo/p; + vtr,, i > 1. (30)
By construction, given {P*), these real share demand expectations are fulfilled along any
path for which the savings sequence (5*) is fulfilled.
Finally, what about dividend consistency, nonnegative net receipts, and fulfilled dividend
expectations in each period t? Combining (28) with (30) for i = 1, one obtains
^1 —9q — d^Oo . (31)
And noting that (27) implies that Mq/P* = q*_iMolP*_j^ for ali i > 2, it follows from (20),
(29), and (30) that
Consequently, expected net receipts in each period t >1 satisfy
< = v,[0t-eu =
(32)
(33)
where 9q = Oq > 0. Thus, in period 1, dividend consistency holds and expected net receipts
are nonnegative. A simple induction argument then establishes that 9^ > 9l_-^ > 0 for all
< > 1, hence dividend consistency holds and expected net earnings are nonnegative in each
period t > I. Finally, given the fulfillment of the real share demand expectations in each
period t > I, li follows from (33) that all dividend expectations are fulfilled as well.
In summary, infinitely many Corporate Economy equilibria can be constructed to sup
port the savings and rate of return sequences (5*) and (q*). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.9. The proof of case (a) follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3,
established in the course of proving Proposition 6.8.
Suppose (22) holds as a strict inequality. It then follows from Lemma 3 that the sub
sequence (q2t-i : t > 1) is strictly increasing in i over the subinterval [g*,!] and the sub
sequence [q^t '• t > I) is strictly decreasing in t over the subinterval [l,gTnax]- It follows by
the monotone convergence theorem that these subsequences must converge to elements in
these subintervals, say qi € [q"^ 1] and qu G [1, respectively. If qi = qu = 1, then ql
IX
converges cyclically to the golden rule rate of return q = 1. Suppose qi < qu, implying that
the fuU sequence (q*) converges to a limit cycle supported by the period 2 orbit {qL,Qu}
with either gx, < 1 or 1 < qu. In order for such a limit cycle to exist, it must hold by (20)
that s{qL) = qus{qu) and s(q[j) = qLs{qL)- But this imphes that s{qL) = qhqu^iqL), which
is only possible if qLqu = 1 with < 1 < <lU' Q.E.D.
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